9. In treating the rabbinic text as a site of political strife, I am inspired by Albert Baumgarten's ''The Akiban Opposition, '' Hebrew Union College Annual 50 (1979): 179-97 . In that essay Baumgarten approached a story in the Palestinian Talmud (yH . ag 3.1), which on its surface bears no sign of polemic, as a site of political struggle. As a result he was able to offer a contribution to the political history of the rabbinic world of late antique Palestine. Similar politicized readings of ancient texts occur frequently in the writings of Baumgarten's mentor, Morton Smith. For an excellent example, see Smith's ''The Account of Simon Magus in Acts 8, '' in Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume, vol. 2 (English section), ed. S. Lieberman (Jerusalem, 1965) , 735-49, as well as the various chapters in his Palestinian Parties and Politics That Shaped the Old Testament (2nd ed.; London, 1987) . This essay is indebted to this model. 10. The Mishnah (and to a lesser degree the Tosefta) is a patriachal work, founded primarily on the teachings of the school of R. Akiva and his disciples. Because it was a product of the house of the patriarch, from a social-political perspective it cannot be seen as representing merely one group or perspective among others of equal political standing. Rather, it must be considered as representing the dominant voice among Palestinian rabbis of the second and early third centuries C.E. This is not a claim about the theological or ideological value of the assertions of that group but only a claim concerning its political power. In this sense I refer to it as representing the ''mainstream'' among Palestinian rabbis of the tannaitic era.
11. The break between 1.15 and 2.8 is an interpolation, which has long been recognized as stemming from the ''house of the Patriarch.'' See Menahem Kister, Studies in Avot de-Rabbi Nathan: Text, Redaction and Interpretation (Hebrew; Jerusalem, 1998) Graeco-Roman Near East (Oxford, 2004) , 107-16. The question remains, however, whether 2.8 is part of the old source, as its terminology and opening phrase (''received'') seem to indicate, or whether the original chain of tradition ended with Hillel and Shammai at 1.15, while 2.8 was stylized in a similar manner only to create a sense of connection. The former seems to be the majority's opinion, and I too tend to view things in this manner. See, for example, Jacob N. Epstein, Introduction to Tannaitic Literature: Mishna, Tosephta and Halakhic Midrashim (Hebrew; Jerusalem, 1957) 290 JQR 105.3 (2015) transition in the rabbinic world, in that RYBZ is said to have had students, unlike any of his predecessors. After claiming that RYBZ ''received'' from Hillel and Shammai, and quoting his own aphorism, the mishnah records RYBZ's praise for each of his students and adds a concluding comment of evaluation:
[A] Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai received from Hillel and Shammai.
[B] He would say: If you did 12 much Torah, do not take credit for yourself, for it is for this that you have been created. (Tü bingen, 2003) , 161-62. However, some scholars prefer the latter option. Kister (Studies in Avot de-Rabbi Nathan, 121-22) even goes a step further and raises (with caution, to be sure) the possibility that the very mention of RYBZ in 2.8 is not original, and that the present opening of that mishnah is a later addition to a source that opened, in fact, with RYBZ's disciples, without mentioning the master's relation to Hillel and Shammai. Indeed, one could argue that the mishnah's repetition of RYBZ's name when introducing his disciples (''five disciples Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai had''), rather than using a pronoun (''he had five disciples''), supports such a conjecture. For had this sentence been a natural continuation of the one preceding, the pronoun would have sufficed. The mishnah's style, in other words, could be taken as evidence indicating that the sentence ''Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai had five disciples'' marks a different source. In the body of MS Kaufman (Budapest A 50) of the Mishnah, however, no mention of RYBZ's name appears in that sentence. Rather, the reading there is 'rl wyh μydymlt hçmj, and only in the margin there are two glosses: (1) wl, to be inserted after wyh, and (2)˜h wlyaw yykz˜b˜njwy, to be inserted after 'rl. The text, after the emendations, reads therefore μydymlt hmçh [˜h wlyaw yykz˜b˜njwy] 'rl [wl] wyh. This is indeed the reading found in other witnesses (see Sharvit, Tractate Avoth, 94) , but according to the text before its ''correction'' our mishnah says rl wyh μydymlt hçmj (read wl wyh μydymlt hçmj), that is, ''he had five students,'' without repeating RYBZ's name. Thus, we are left with no evidence in the text of the mishnah itself leading in a direction of suspecting the authenticity of the mention of RYBZ and his connection with Hillel and Shammai at the head of mAvot 2. 8. 12. So MS Kaufman and most other witnesses (tyç [ μa) . See Sharvit, Tractate Avot, 94. The reading tdml μa (if you studied), found in some secondary witnesses, reflects an emendation based on difficulty understanding the use of the verb ''do'' (hç[) 14 Despite the innocent appearance of this mishnah, the truth is that it is politically dramatic: it astonishingly praises, in [E], R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus as RYBZ's most important disciple, although R. Eliezer and his teachings were rejected by the mainstream of rabbinic circles in Palestine of the tannaitic age. 15 The mishnah knows very well that among RYBZ's disciples was also R. Yehoshua, who was the most important sage for the ''mainstream, '' 16 but nevertheless it claims that the ousted R. Eliezer was the most important of RYBZ's students. Evidently, therefore, this mishnah cannot have stemmed from mainstream rabbinic circles. It most probably emanates from circles close to R. Eliezer or his followers.
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13. See n. 11. 14. mAvot 2.8-9, according to MS Kaufman. For variant readings, see Sharvit, Tractate Avot, [93] [94] [95] [96] [97] 15. See Menahem Kahana, ''On the Fashioning and Aims of the Mishnaic Controversy'' (Hebrew), Tarbiz 73 (2003) : 51-81. The famous post-tannaitic ''oven of Ah . nai'' story describes the excommunication of R. Eliezer (see yMK 3.1, 81c-d; bBM 59b). Although the historicity of this amoraic text cannot be confirmed, it is clear from the sugya in the Palestinian Talmud (ibid.) that thirdcentury Palestinian rabbis took it for granted that R. JQR 105.3 (2015) Apparently, from the same circles stems the tannaitic tradition, found in Sifre Deuteronomy, that encourages one to use the judicial services offered by the courts of RYBZ and R. Eliezer as the best way to fulfill the commandment to seek justice in Dt 16.20: '' 'Justice, justice you shall pursue'-follow a court whose decision [procedure?] is commendable. Follow the court of Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, follow the court of R. Eliezer. '' 18 The fact that of all of RYBZ's disciples only R. Eliezer is named indicates that this tradition views him as the only one worthy of mention.
The audacity of that tradition's refusal to mention any of RYBZ's disciples other than R. Eliezer is clarified and amplified by contrast with the much more developed parallel in bSan 32b, where various rabbinic figures are mentioned:
Our rabbis taught: ''Justice, justice you shall pursue'' (Dt 16.20)-this means: follow the scholars to their academies. Follow Rabbi Eliezer to Lydda, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai to Beror Hail, Rabbi Yehoshua to Peki'in, Rabban Gamliel to Yavneh, Rabbi Akiva to Bene Berak, Rabbi Mathia to Rome, Rabbi Hanania ben Teradion to Sikhni, Rabbi Jose to Sepphoris, Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra to Nisibis, Rabbi Yehoshua to the exile, Rabbi to Beth She'arim, and the sages to the chamber of hewn stones.
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In contrast to this more developed later tradition that mentions many sages, the tannaitic source mentions R. Eliezer alone alongside RYBZ, indicating that the Sifre tradition stems from rabbinic circles tied to R. Eliezer and his followers. 20. One should not dismiss out of hand the possibility that the tradition as preserved in the Sifre is a very early one, formulated in the days of RYBZ and R. Eliezer themselves. For after their death their courts did not continue to function and there would have been no sense in encouraging people to use their legal services when these did not exist. However, for the purposes of the current discussion this hypothetical possibility makes no difference, and its rejection by no means affects the argument of this essay.
(late 2nd c.), which may be seen as another chain of rabbinic tradition: ''Rabbi Yehoshua presented before Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, Rabbi Akiva presented before Rabbi Yehoshua, Hananiah ben Hinai presented before Rabbi Akiva. '' 21 Although related to esoteric knowledge, this tradition claims that the line of transmission of rabbinic teaching was from RYBZ to R. Yehoshua, who therefore must be seen as RYBZ's most important student. In mAvot 2.8-9, by contrast, nothing points in this direction.
Furthermore, RYBZ's praise for R. Yehoshua in mAvot 2.8-9 (fortunate is she who gave birth to him) feels faint. 22 Unlike all other students of RYBZ who are praised because of some positive characteristic or virtue, of R. Yehoshua himself RYBZ has virtually nothing to say. It is not a coincidence that the much later tradition of Avot de-Rabbi Nathan A (ARNA) attempted to correct this unpleasant impression by putting in RYBZ's mouth praise of R. Yehoshua as ''a threefold cord . . . not quickly broken (Eccl 4.12) . '' 23 Yet the fact that the earlier version of that work (ARNB) is identical with the Mishnah at this point indicates that version A represents here a very late reworking of the original tradition, which seems to withhold praise from R. Yehoshua. It would seem that our mishnah attempted not only to elevate R. Eliezer's status but also to lower R. Yehoshua's. It could not, therefore, have stemmed from mainstream tannaitic circles.
To be fair, right after the passage marked [E] the mishnah brings a contesting tradition (in the name of Abba Shaul), according to which RYBZ considered R. Elazar ben Arakh the most important of all of Israel's sages, and not R. Eliezer: ''Abba Shaul says in his [RYBZ's] [Jerusalem, 1957] , 158-59): ''fortunate is she who gave birth to you; fortunate are you, Abraham our father, that this is he who is your descendant.'' However, this is not an independent tradition (which could have testified to the importance of that praise), but rather an obvious conflation of the manner in which RYBZ praises R. Elazar in tH . ag 2.1 and the praise of R. Yehoshua in mAvot 2.8. The former praise is given also to R. Akiva in SifreNum §75 (ed. H. S. Horowitz [Leipzig, 1911] (Stanford, Calif., 1998), 233-65. 27. That R. Elazar ben Arakh too was ''ousted'' seems to me clear from the very fact that he is nowhere mentioned as the author/source of any halakhic saying in the Mishnah or Tosefta. Most of the few references to him in other places in early rabbinic literature were discussed by Goshen-Gottstein, Sinner and the Amnesiac, and one may add Mekhilta de-Rashbi on Ex 3.8 (ed. Hoffmann, 2; ed. Epstein-Melamed, 2); SifreDt §160 (ed. Finkelstein, 211); and Midrash tannaim on Dt 17.18 (ed. Hoffmann, 105). The story of his departure to Emmaus (ARNB, chap. 29 [ed. Schechter, 30a] ) attempts to ''mask'' an unpleasant fact by offering an ''explanation'' for his disappearance from rabbinic circles, there blaming his preference for bodily pleasure over the study of Torah. This is clearly a cover-up meant to hide the real reason, which we do not know. It cannot, however, mask the fact that he somehow left the confines of the rabbinic world. The positive tannaitic tradition about R. Elazar ben Arakh, in tH . ag 2.1 depicting him as an intimate student of RYBZ, is rare and unique. Immediately following it is a statement attributed to R. Yossi ben Judah that the ''true'' chain of transmission stretches from RYBZ to R. Yehoshua (and from him to R. Akiva). It should be admitted, though, that the latter statement, too, is atypical in its own assertions that R. Akiva's most important student was H . ananiah ben H . inai (tH . ag 2.1), who surely would not have been considered as such by the mainstream. In Mishnah an impressive indication that it originated in circles other than those who produced the Mishnah.
Indeed, tractate Avot preserves the sayings of another two rejected rabbinic figures: Akavia ben Mahallalel (mAvot 3.1) and Elisha ben Abuya (mAvot 4.20) . Of the former we are told in m'Eduy 5.6 the following: Akavia ben Mahallalel gave testimony in four matters. They said to him: Akavia, retract the four things that you have said and we shall make you a head (lit. father) of court for Israel. He said to them: it is better for me to be called a fool my whole life but not to be deemed a wicked person before the Omnipresent for even a single moment, so that people should not say: because [he desired] high office he retracted . . . And they excommunicated him, and he died while in the state of being excommunicated, and the court stoned his coffin.
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This is a rare case of excommunication in tannaitic literature. 29 It is therefore unsurprising that, in that same mishnah, R. Judah denies the fact, claiming instead that the excommunicated man was one Eliezer ben Hanach-an otherwise unknown figure, who does not seem even to have been a ''rabbi. '' 30 Saldarini underscores that ''at some point, possibly the late second century, someone felt the need to deny the shocking excommunication of Akavia and modified the story with Judah's comment. '' 31 As ''Rabbi Judah'' in the Mishnah is usually R. Judah ben Ilai, who was a close disciple of R. Eliezer, 32 one may wish to consider the possibility that R. Judah's denial of Akavia's excommunication is somehow related to his ''Eliezeran'' association. 33 If so, perhaps the willingness of tractate Avot to cite Akavia's teaching is also related to its source in Eliezeran circles. Such a suggestion cannot be made with respect to Avot's citation of Elisha ben Abuya's saying (mAvot 4.20), for nothing in our sources suggests a connection between him and R. Eliezer. However, the very fact that the chief heretic of classical rabbinic tradition-whose name was obliterated and replaced by the opaque ''ah . er '' 34 -is found in tractate Avot without any special comment, is in itself remarkable. of Kefar Hannaniah (3.6); R. Elazar ben Yehuda of Bartotah (3.7); R. Yaakov (3.7, according to the reading of most manuscripts); R. Dostai bar Yannai (3.8); R. Haninah ben Dosa (3.9); R. Elazar ha-Moda'i (3.11); R. Levitas of Yavneh (4.4); R. Ishmael, the son of R. Yossi (4.7); R. Yonatan (4.9); R. Yohanan ha-Sandlar (4.11); R. Nehorai (4.14); R. Yannai (4.15); R. Mattia ben Harash (4.15); Shmuel ha-Katan (4.19); R. Yossi bar Yehuda of Kefar ha-Bavli (4.20); R. Elazar ha-Kapar (4.21). Again, some of these sages are not mentioned in the Mishnah or in the Tosefta even once.
37 Their sayings are presented naturally, without any sign of being pronounced by problematic figures and without giving us any indication that any one of these mentioned masters was ever condemned by rabbinic tradition. This, too, is a strong indication that tractate Avot does not stem from those rabbinic circles that are represented in the Mishnah.
To be sure, among the forty-two named rabbis whose aphorisms are quoted in chapters 3 and 4 of Avot are also some of the most prominent sages of the Mishnah, such as R. Akiva (3.12); R. Ishmael (3.13); R. Elazar ben Azariah (3.17); Ben Zomma (4.1); Ben Azzai (4.2); R. Yohanan ben Beroka (4.4); R. Zaddok (4.5); R. Yossi (4.6); R. Meir (4.10); R. Eliezer ben Yaakov (4.11); R. Elazar (4.12); R. Yehuda (4.13); and R. Shimon (4.13). But the number of the ''rare'' rabbis in these two chapters is so large that the unusual character of these chapters is difficult to deny.
MOSES RECEIVED TORAH FROM SINAI
If a substantial part of tractate Avot does not stem from the rabbinic circles in Palestine who produced the Mishnah, but rather reflects the teachings of a different school that was most probably associated with R. Eliezer, what about its opening? Would it not be reasonable to assume 37. Some of these ''rare'' sages (e.g., R. Elazar ha-Moda'i and R. Yonatan) occupy a prominent place in the so-called halakhic midrashim stemming from the so-called school of R. Ishmael (primarily the Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael on Exodus and the Sifre on Numbers).
38. Note that none of the famous rabbis of the Mishnah who flourished in late second century and were contemporaries of R. Judah the Patriarch (such as R. Yossi ben Yehuda; R. Elazar ben Shimon; R. Shimon ben Elazar, etc.) is mentioned in these two chapters of Avot. JQR 105.3 (2015) that the opening lines of Avot, too-the ''chain of tradition'' and its underlying ideological claim that the Torah of the rabbis stems, ultimately, from Moses at Sinai-reflect specifically the ideology of that other school?
That Avot's chain of tradition passage is unique, unparalleled by any other early rabbinic document, has long been recognized. 39 The striking absence of the ''House of Shammai'' and the ''House of Hillel'' from that list makes its aberration even greater. These two branches of Torah scholarship of late Second Temple period are so prominent in tannaitic literature that Avot's failure to mention them cannot be considered mere accident. The chain of tradition of tractate Avot presupposes that the phenomenon of a sage who has a circle of students is a historical novum that first appeared with RYBZ. Hence, there is no place for the houses of Hillel and Shammai in its historical scheme. By contrast, according to a famous statement of R. Yossi in tH . ag 2.9 ‫ס(‬ tSan 7.1), ''Since the students of Shammai and Hillel multiplied, the Torah became like two Torahs.'' That is, Hillel and Shammai already had many students. 40 How far this is from the historical picture constructed by Avot's genealogy! It seems quite clear, then, that not only does mAvot 2.8 and forward derive from circles different from the Mishnah's mainstream, but mAvot 1.1-15 does too.
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But are these circles one and the same? Do these ideologies reflect the same ''dissenting'' school? I have already noted that mAvot 2.8 is not detached from the chain but is rather an integral part of it, serving as its concluding passage. 40. Post-tannaitic traditions refer to eighty pairs of students that Hillel had (see ARNB, chap. 28; yNed, 5.6), but unfortunately nothing to confirm these figures is found in tannaitic literature.
41. Jacob Neusner has noted that none of the sayings quoted in Avot's chain of tradition are referred to by any other tannaitic text; he explained this fact by suggesting that it was not composed before the third century. See Jacob Neusner, The Rabbinic Traditions about the Pharisees (Leiden, 1971) In his effort to characterize the halakhic ideology of R. Eliezer, the late Yitzhak D. Gilat emphasized a fundamental quality of prerabbinic halakhic thought, to which he contrasted the halakhic revolution of the rabbis:
One of the characteristic features of the ancient halakhah is the absence of any distinction between the teaching of the Pentateuch and the oral tradition which originated in the exegesis and doctrine of the sages. The earliest authorities set equal value on all the teachings they had received and regarded the tradition which they had inherited from their ancestors as a single whole. Hence the extreme punctilious attention paid equally to matters treated by the later halakhah as trivial and to those of greater weight. The differentiation between the teaching of the written Torah and that of the ''scribes'' ‫ס(‬ sages) and between Pentateuchal and rabbinical enactments is itself a product of the tannaitic period, which began in the last generations preceding the destruction of the Temple. This differentiation was developed in the schools as a result of the close study of the Torah; it led to the classification and arrangement of the various halakhot and to the formation of general, abstract concepts and definitions . . . By reducing the scope of prohibitions, by defining some of them as rabbinic prohibitions and by relegating these to a level lower than that of the Torah-laws the sages opened up possibilities for relaxation and leniency under certain conditions.
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According to Gilat, in the so-called ancient halakhah (or, as some prefer to call it, ''sectarian halakhah'') both scriptural and exegetical or oral laws had the same status, because all the laws claimed divine origin. Or, as Aharon Shemesh has recently put it: ''The unity of the halakhah in sectarian thinking is of a dual aspect: all its details are of the same heavenly origins and have the same binding status. '' 51 According to this outlook, the heart of the halakhic revolution introduced by the rabbis was the very creation of difference (hence: hierarchy) within the halakhic system, and 50. Gilat, R. Eliezer, 60-61. 51. Shemesh, Halakhah in the Making, 71. the recognition of the human, earthly, nondivine element therein. To use Shemesh's words again: ''One of the central characteristics of rabbinic halakhah is the creation of a set of categories that distinguish between different authoritative statuses of the law or between different rulings that apply in different circumstances. '' 52 By defining some of the halakhic prohibitions as rabbinic the sages opened up possibilities for manipulation and relaxation under certain conditions. As has been suggested by various scholars, ''a certain similarity existed between the approach of Bet Shammai and that of sectarian halakhah. '' 53 Vered Noam, who demonstrated ''the affinity between Qumranic views and certain halakhic positions [of] . . . R. Eliezer b. Hyrcanus, a disciple of Beit Shammai,'' has raised the possibility that ''this resemblance may have been the factor that decided the fate of the house of Shammai's views, relegating them to the sidelines of Pharisaic discourse.'' 54 According to Noam, the similarity is evident not only in details but also in that ''both appear to share an early, stringent halakhic outlook, based more on tradition and authority, and less on contemporary human exegetical creativity; both seem to adhere to the more literal meaning of Scripture, tending toward stringency and uniformity, in abstract principles as well as in everyday life. '' 55 Following Gilat and Shemesh, however, it may be suggested that the affinity between the approach of the school of Shammai and R. Eliezer, on the one hand, and that of sectarian halakhah, on the other, is related to an even deeper aspect of their view of the revelation of the law to Moses at Sinai.
In light of these observations I would like turn now to the famous opening passage of the Tosefta, tractate 'Eduyot, and to suggest that it be read as an inner rabbinic polemic against the claim of Avot's ''chain of tradition'':
[A] When the sages gathered in the vineyard at Yavneh they said: The time is coming at which a person will go looking for a word of Torah and will not find it, for a word of scribes and will not find it.
52. Ibid., 70. See also Shemesh, ''Thou Shalt Not Rabbinize the Qumran Sectarians: On the Inflexibility of the Halakha in the Dead Sea Scrolls'' (forthcoming).
53. Noam, ''Traces of Sectarian Halakhah,'' 67-68, and the references cited therein, at nn. 2-3.
54. Noam, ibid., 67. I would obviously prefer to speak of ''rabbinic,'' rather than ''pharisaic,'' discourse as the historical process to which Noam refers is entirely rabbinic, and no pharisaic text is truly known to us. However, this issue should not distract us here.
55. Ibid. 302 JQR 105.3 (2015) [B] As it is said: ''Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord [sic], when I will send a famine on the land etc.
[not a famine of bread, nor a thirst for water, but of hearing the word of the Lord. They shall wander from sea to sea and from north to east they shall run to and fro] to seek the word of the Lord but they shall not find it'' (Amos 8.11-12).
[B*] ''The word of the Lord''-this refers to prophecy. ''The word of the Lord''-this refers to the eschaton. ''The word of the Lord''-this refers to one who seeks a word of Torah that is similar to another. ''chain of tradition'' of tractate Avot has never been noticed. According to the Tosefta, in order to overcome (or to prevent) a foreseen difficultythat is, that one would seek a word of Torah, or a word of scribes, but would not find it [A]-the sages of Yavneh decided to begin with the teachings of the school of Shammai and the school of Hillel [C] . The precise meaning of their act is a matter of much controversy, 58 but the fact remains that they did not decide to begin with the teachings of the people of the great assembly, nor with those of Simeon the Righteous or Antigonos of Sokho, nor even with the early pairs. Rather, they began with the teachings of the schools of Hillel and Shammai. This is in itself quite amazing, for had it been true (as it is frequently claimed) that a fundamental premise of rabbinic ideology was that ''Moses received a Torah from Sinai,'' which was handed down to the people of the great assembly, from whom the pairs ''received'' it, how is it possible that the sages who gathered at Yavneh decided to ''begin'' only with the teachings of the schools of Hillel and Shammai? Were the teachings of earlier sages not considered worthy of memorization?
The Yavnean sages' decision to begin with the schools of Hillel and Shammai, as told by t'Eduy 1.1, must be seen, therefore, as a bold statement. ''Our Torah,'' so these sages seem to have claimed, does not begin at Sinai. It does not begin even with the early pairs. It begins with Hillel and Shammai, the true founders of rabbinic tradition. Already this implied claim places t'Eduy 1.1 in sharp tension with mAvot 1.1-15. Conventional wisdom regards t'Eduy 1.1 as a text meant to address a fear of the loss of halakhic tradition. This anxiety was explained by a variety of factors, among them the calamities of the destruction of Jerusalem and the Second Temple; the ensuing political changes; the lack of institutional backing; and perhaps also the expansion of rabbinic teaching, the new scale of which threatened the ability of the sage to memorize it all. For this reason they decided to collect and organize their traditions, so as to secure their survival.
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This view is deeply influenced (although probably unconsciously so) by a much later parallel from bShab 138b, 61 in which a baraita opens: ''When our rabbis gathered in the vineyard at Yavneh they said: The Torah is destined to be forgotten in Israel.'' This formulation, however, simply reiterates a saying of the Babylonian amora Rav that is quoted in that sugya just two lines earlier: ''Said Rav: The Torah is destined to be forgotten in Israel.'' There is good reason to suspect, therefore, that the text of the baraita as it appears in the Babylonian Talmud is the result of a late Babylonian reworking of the early tannaitic text. 62 Reading the former into the latter is thus methodologically problematic.
60. This view was given expression already by Rav Sherira Gaon in his famous Epistle. See Benjamin M. Lewin, ed., Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon (Jerusalem, 1972) , 12. Along the same lines, Rav Sherira explains R. Judah the Patriarch's decision to compose the Mishnah. See ibid., 20-23. Since Rav Sherira this view has been adopted by many others. See Naeh, ''Art of Memory, '' 584, n. 192 . Naeh himself suggested a profoundly different interpretation of the problem the Yavnean rabbis were envisioning: ''The sages in these sources were not afraid that the Torah will be lost from Israel, but rather [they were afraid] of the disappearance of the keys to the growing amount of [rabbinic] material'' (ibid.). A similar view was expressed (in a less definite manner) by Sussmann, ''History of the Halakha and the Dead Sea Scrolls,' ' 73, n. 238, s.v. rb[mh. As much as this suggestion is different from the conventional one, it shares with it the fundamental view that the Yavnean sages were concerned because they feared a future reality in which the rabbinic tradition will, for whatever reason, be inaccessible and hence, in a deep sense, ''lost. No doubt it is easy to slip into the traditional assumption, based on the formulation of the text in the Babylonian Talmud, that the Yavnean rabbis' concern was the danger of forgetting. On this assumption, it is perfectly natural to view their act as relating to collection of material and its organization for the sake of its preservation. And indeed, when read on its own the phrase ''Let us begin: which teaching belongs to the school of Shammai and which teaching belongs to the school of Hillel'' (or, following the reading of MS Erfurt, ''Let us begin from Shammai and Hillel'') may be understood as describing an act of collection and organization. At first sight, then, there is no reason not to think that the Yavnean sages' act was aimed at preserving rabbinic material. However, although this interpretation is possible, nothing makes it necessary, and nothing in this phrase requires its understanding in this manner. The need to classify traditions may be motivated by various concerns, not exclusively by a concern to avoid their loss. For example, one may wish to classify rabbinic teachings so as to be able to use them for halakhic purposes, or because the halakhic stances of certain groups, or individuals, were rejected and contained opinions that one should not follow. The mere act of collecting says nothing about its motivation.
In fact, the widespread assumption that the work of collection and classification of the teachings of the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel at Yavneh was an act of preservation, is itself not as simple as it appears. For a proper interpretation of the Tosefta is required to explain how the Yavnean sages' act was meant to impede the danger that one will be looking for ''a word of Torah'' or ''a word of scribes'' without being able to find it. Even if one is willing to consider the two schools as ''scribal,'' such an act cannot be seen as answering the other half of the concern-words of Torah. The standard reading, in other words, fails to explain how the collection and classification of rabbinic material enabled (or was meant to enable) the prevention of the danger stated at the beginning of the text, that is, that neither ''a word of Torah'' nor ''a word of scribes'' will be found. JQR 105.3 (2015) Beyond this interpretive consideration there is yet another fundamental difficulty: the teachings attributed to Hillel and Shammai and their schools in the entire rabbinic corpus, are not so large as to justify any fear that they are too difficult to memorize and hence might be lost. 63 It turns out, in sum, that the conventional interpretation of t'Eduy as motivated primarily by fear of loss of halakhah requires reconsideration.
Indeed, setting aside the later tradition from bShab 138b (The Torah is destined to be forgotten in Israel), it can hardly be acceptable as a reading of the Tosefta passage at all. Besides its silence on motive, no interpretation that I know satisfactorily or precisely explains the two phrases ''words of Torah'' and ''words of scribes. '' 64 Traditionally, the phrase ''words of Torah'' is understood loosely to denote rabbinic wisdom in the most general sense.
65 Accordingly, the Tosefta is understood to express the fear that people would seek rabbinic teaching, but for some reason they would not be able to find it.
However, if the meaning of ''words of Torah'' is indeed ''rabbinic teaching'' in the broad sense, why did the Tosefta need to mention ''words of scribes''? We should presume that their division indicates their usage here as terms of art-relating to different kinds of halakhic teaching, not to ''rabbinic learning'' in general. The juxtaposition of the two types of words helps us to discern their precise meaning in t'Eduy 1.1. The phrase ''words of scribes'' can be found in numerous places in tannaitic literature to designate a halakhic teaching known to be of rabbinic origin.
66 As such, 63. As noted above, Sussmann and Naeh understand the difficulty that the Yavnean sages were envisioning as related to the growing amount of rabbinic teaching. But this cannot be said with respect to tractate 'Eduyot as is found in the Mishnah or in the Tosefta. This tractate is relatively small, and of such a text one can hardly say that it was too difficult to ''manage'' and to memorize. See also Halivni, Mishnah, Midrash and Gemara, 46. 64. Steven Fraade was sensitive to the precise formulation of the text here, but he considered it as a ''slippage. '' See Fraade, ''Rabbinic Polysemy, '' 19, n. 56 . Fraade is correct, of course, that a shift from God's word to rabbinic teaching can be seen in various places in early rabbinic literature (ibid., 13, n. 35). However, I find this suggestion difficult to accept in the present case, for reasons to be explicated below.
65. See, for example, Fraade, ibid., 14; 16; [18] [19] . See Ephraim E. Urbach, ''The Drasha as a Basis of the Halakhah and the Problem of the Soferim'' (Hebrew), Tarbiz 27 (1958): 166-82 ‫ס(‬ idem, The World of the Sages [Jerusalem, 1988], 56-66) . Urbach notes that ''in early sources the term 'words of Scribes' still has the meaning of '[law derived by means of] midrash' '' (World of the Sages, 61). Should this understanding be applied to t'Eduy 1.1, it would mean that the text makes a distinction between halakhic rules that are purely ''from the Torah'' and those that are derived from the Torah by means it appears in various tannaitic texts in contrast to a halakhic teaching considered to be of biblical origin. 67 In context, then, ''a word of Torah'' necessarily means a biblical precept. It does not entail the loose meaning of ''rabbinic, traditional teaching,'' as we frequently use this expression in contemporary parlance. Rather it means precisely what its literal meaning is: a halakhic ruling of biblical origin.
The Yavnean sages' fear, on this reading, was not that ''rabbinic wisdom'' (in the broadest sense) will be lost but rather that one will be unable to find either biblical law or rabbinic teaching. This point, which is virtually always overlooked by readers of the Tosefta, may turn out to be of much significance. For as the formulation of the text clearly indicates, the sages who gathered at Yavneh began a process of identification: ''They said: Let us begin: which teaching belongs to the School of Shammai, and which teaching belongs to the School of Hillel.'' How was such an endeavor expected to ensure the prevention of the anticipated situation, in which one will be unable to find either a ruling of biblical origin or a ruling of rabbinic origin? 68 We need to assume that the problem they of its interpretation. Only the former are truly ''biblical''; the latter, although closely connected with the Torah, are nevertheless not ''biblical'' but rather of rabbinic origins. As is well known, this is the heart of a famous dispute between Nahmanides and Maimonides, and the focal point of the former's critique of the latter's first two principles of enumerating the commandments, as presented in his introduction to 308 JQR 105.3 (2015) anticipated and attempted to avert by properly ascribing each halakhic ruling to a specific rabbinic authority had to do with an inability to identify ''words of Torah'' and to distinguish between them and ''words of scribes.'' They feared a situation in which people might consider the halakhah as one seamless corpus of legal teachings of the same value and authority, without giving each ruling its proper weight in the normative system. Their project, then, was not merely one of collection and organization but one of classification. The first step toward such a project was the attempt to identify the ''owner'' of each teaching. By proclaiming that a given saying belongs to a specific sage it became clear that it is not of biblical origin; that it is not ''a word of Torah.'' Support for the understanding of the envisioned danger as related to the mixed and unsorted state of halakhic tradition (and not to the mere difficulty of memorizing it) may be found in the parallel midrash on Amos 8.12, as it appears in the SifreDt §48 (on Dt 11.22):
Behold it says: ''They shall run to and fro to seek the word of the Lord but they shall not find it'' (Amos 8.12) . . . R. Shimon ben Yohai says: Does this teach that the Torah is destined to be forgotten from Israel?! But it has already been said: ''For it will not be forgotten from the mouth of their descendants'' (Dt 31.21)! Rather, [it refers to a reality in which] so-and-so prohibits and so-and-so permits; so-and-so declares ''impure'' and so-and-so declares ''pure,'' and they will not find a clear teaching.
69 the danger noted in [A] (see, for example, Urbach, ''Class-Status and Leadership,'' 18), so that not being able to find a word of Torah is equivalent to no word of Torah being ''similar to another'' (Urbach, ibid.; Naeh, ''Art of Memory,'' 584). However, not only is the latter expression ambiguous and at odds with the rest of the midrash (where ''the word of the Lord'' is identified with a specific noun: ''This refers to prophesy . . . this refers to the eschaton''), but far more: it cannot truly be understood as explaining the opening problem because, as we have seen, the expression ''a word of Torah'' in the latter bears the meaning of a specifically biblical precept, while in the midrash it most probably refers to ''rabbinic teaching.'' This is clear from the parallel in SifreDt §48 (ed. Finkelstein, 112-13), in which Amos 8.12 is interpreted as referring to the existence of halakhic disagreements between the rabbis (on the connection between the Tosefta's midrash and the Sifre, see Naeh, ''Art of Memory,'' 584 and n. 190 there). If [B*] cannot be read as an explanation of the anticipated danger, it appears to be secondary: presumably, the tosefta was originally comprised of the anticipated danger [A] and its remedy [C] (and whether or not it included a biblical prooftext is immaterial).
[B] may therefore be extracted, and this surgery enables us to offer the following alternative explanation of the danger the Yavnean sages were envisioning.
69. Ed. Finkelstein, 112-13.
R. Shimon denies an understanding of Amos 8.12 as prophesying that the Torah is destined to be forgotten by the Jewish people, because in Dt 31.21 God had promised that the Torah will never be lost from Israel. Rather, R. Shimon maintains, Amos's prophecy (that ''the word of the Lord'' will not be found) refers to a situation in which one will not be able to find ''a clear teaching.'' When halakhic teachings are not ''clear'' but rather are ''mixed up,'' 70 one is unable to find ''the word of the Lord.'' The Torah, thus, is not forgotten, but God's word cannot be found therein, because the halakhic tradition is mixed up of different and contradicting opinions (''so-and-so prohibits and so-and-so permits; so-and-so declares 'impure' and so-and-so declares 'pure' '').
71
To be sure, the anxiety expressed by this midrash is not identical with the one expressed by the Tosefta. In the Sifre the problem stems from the existence of opposing halakhic opinions, and it aspires (implicitly, of course) to halakhic unanimity among the rabbis. This difficulty cannot be read into the Tosefta, because the measures that it says that the Yavnean 70. The meaning of ''clear'' (rwrb) in R. Shimon's midrash is not ''easy to understand'' but rather ''distinguishable,'' the opposite (in mishnaic Hebrew) of ''mixed up'' (lwlb). See Marcus Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature (London, 1903), 191 ; Naeh, ''Art of Memory,'' 564. As correctly observed by Naeh, the homilies in the Sifre are concerned with the learning activity of the rabbinic student, who is required not only to absorb and internalize his master's teachings but also to sort them. He suggests that the classification of halakhic teachings was necessary for their memorization. See Naeh, ibid., 564-65. 71. This is the plain meaning of the text, that is, it refers to the very existence of halakhic disagreement as a source of confusion with respect to ''the word of the Lord.'' See also Fraade, ''Rabbinic Polysemy,'' 14; Azzan Yadin-Israel, ''Rabbinic Polysemy: A Response to Steven Fraade,'' AJS Review 38 (2014): 133. A similar concern is given voice in tSot 7. [9] [10] [11] [12] : ''Should one say: Since the School of Shammai declare 'unclean' and the School of Hillel declare 'clean,' so-and-so prohibits and so-and-so permits, for what purpose do I study Torah?'' Here, too, the source of one's anxiety is the very existence of halakhic disagreement, which casts doubt on the very validity of the material. Naeh's interpretation, that the concern attributed to the student in this text relates to his difficulty to memorize the different opinions, is influenced by the formulation of this sentence as it is found in the much later parallel in the Babylonian Talmud (bH . ag 3b): ''How can I study Torah,'' as Naeh himself notes (''Art of Memory,'' 574), whereas the Tosefta's formulation leads in a different direction, as correctly noted by Fraade, ''Rabbinic Polysemy, '' 34-35 . For the sake of fairness, however, it should be noted that Naeh's understanding of the concern expressed in this sentence is related to his brilliant analysis of the passage in the Tosefta as a whole (''Art of Memory,'' 571-82), to which I hope to return on another occasion. For the time being, see Fraade, ''Rabbinic Polysemy,'' 31-36. 310 JQR 105.3 (2015) sages took to overcome the threat they were envisioning-that is, their project of identifying the ''owner'' of each halakhic ruling-does not eliminate the existence of halakhic disagreements, and it does not preclude the situation of ''so-and-so prohibits and so-and-so permits; so-and-so declares 'impure' and so-and-so declares 'pure.' '' Despite these differences, the two texts do share a somewhat similar concern relating to the state of the halakhic tradition current in their authors' days: namely, that ''mixed materials'' create a problem. And both texts claim that when the halakhic tradition is not ''clear'' but rather made up of different kinds of teachings, ''the word of the Lord'' and the ''words of Torah'' are in danger of being lost.
Would it not be possible to suggest, therefore, that this was the issue that the sages who gathered at Yavneh were concerned about? While some rabbis maintained that all of the halakhic tradition is rooted in the revelation to Moses at Sinai and therefore has a status equal to words of Torah, the sages who gathered in the vineyard at Yavneh rejected this ideological stance by making a fundamental distinction and emphasizing the human origin of rabbinic teachings.
CONCLUSION
In this essay I have attempted to challenge a widespread view that the idea of the Sinaitic origin of all rabbinic tradition is the conceptual foundation upon which rabbinic Judaism rests, and its ideological manifesto. The most famous expression of this manifesto in rabbinic literature is in tractate Avot. This view is problematic for a number of reasons that I have attempted to lay out. First, this document, I suggest, does not speak for all rabbinic circles but rather emanates from the school of R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus (or his followers), a sage who was not followed by the group we know to represent the mainstream of Palestinian rabbis of the tannaitic era. Second, I demonstrated that the opening passage of t'Eduy may be read as a polemic against the ideology of the school presented by mAvot. While the latter attributes divine status to all of rabbinic teaching, the former considers this view dangerous, and it calls instead for a sharp distinction between ''words of Torah'' and ''words of scribes.''
The ideological claim that rabbinic halakhah is of Sinaitic origin and therefore has a divine status is defensive in its nature. It attempts to ''guard'' rabbinic teaching from a polemical attack, which purports to debunk its authority by emphasizing its human origin. Such attacks played a pivotal role in the anti-pharisaic polemic of various sectarian groups of the Second Temple period. 72 However, that ideology not only lost its necessity in postdestruction, postsectarian times, but, far worse, it became a burden. For if all of the halakhic tradition stems from Moses, its status is similar to that of ''words of Torah,'' which humans cannot manipulate and change. The Yavnean sages therefore needed to reject the Eliezeran claim that all of the halakhah has the status of ''Torah,'' in order to pursue their grand project of adjusting both the law and the ''tradition of the fathers'' to the new circumstances in which they lived. They accomplished this by declaring the authorship of each rabbinic teaching, so as to make its human origin as clear as possible.
The discursive attempt at rejecting a deeply ingrained ideological stance can never fully accomplish its goal so long as the challenges that stance purports to address still exist. The polemical horizon of the pharisaic age lived on in attenuated form in the tannatic age. For this reason, one can find in early rabbinic literature the claims: ''just as the laws of the sabbatical year, its rules and their details, were said at Sinai, so too all [of the laws]-their rules and their details-were said at Sinai,'' 73 and ''even that which a faithful student is destined to rule before his master has already been said to Moses at Sinai. '' 74 This and other similar assertions continued to exist within rabbinic tradition, side by side with the fundamental understanding of the human nature of rabbinic halakhah. The tension and conflict between these two vectors is one of the powerful forces that shaped rabbinic halakhah for generations.
